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PANEL DISCUSSION
A question and answer period followed Professor Ware's speech. Jules
GerardI inquired whether Professor Allen had anticipated Chief Justice
Vinson's dissent in Barrows v. Jackson.2
I would like to be able to say that, of course, I had perfect foresight and
knew this was going to happen. Actually, I'm not sure whether or how
much I thought about the question. I wasn't too surprised when Vinson
took his position. The question in Barrows v. Jackson is one of standing,
and not itself a constitutional issue. I think, myself, that if the court was
going to do what it did in Shelley v. Kraemer, then it is rather odd to draw
the line where Vinson placed it. On the other hand, on the basis of existing
law, Vinson's position was not frivolous. As a matter of fact, people as wise
as a distinguished constitutional law professor at Harvard thought that Vin-
son was quite right in the conclusion he reached. I have often wondered
whether, had I been with Vinson at the time, I might have written one of
those magic memos, and maybe he would have come out the other way.
Professor Ware, when asked about the earliest example of long term
litigation strategy, stated that twenty or thirty-year campaigns originated
with the NAACP efforts. Professor Rotunda then asked both panelists why
several Justices recused themselves from Shelley v. Kraemer. Professor
Allen stated:
It was widely assumed both in the Court and the country... that each of
these three Justices had properties in the District of Columbia burdened by
a restrictive covenant; and this would certainly not be surprising at that
time. There is some mystery about the case of Justice Rutledge, because
Rutledge had participated in a covenant case in the Court of Appeals before
he became a member of the Supreme Court; and apparently at the earlier
time did not think that the matter justified his disqualifying himself ....
He concurred in that [earlier] case on a procedural ground, but indicated
that he was taking no position on the constitutional validity of the cove-
nant's enforcement.
Professor Ware added:
[T]hat was part of the strategy in the District of Columbia cases. Houston
moved to have the trial judge recused to show how pervasive the covenants
were and I guess, to some degree, to embarrass the trial court judge. It was
1. Professor, Washington University School of Law.
2. 346 U.S. 249 (1953) (Vinson, C.J., dissenting from decision barring recovery of damages
from co-covenantor for breach of race restrictive covenant).
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assumed therefore, that the Supreme Court Justices recused themselves be-
cause they lived in homes that were covered by racial covenants.
Judge Higgenbothom next asked how great a factor the sociological
data had been in persuading the Court to decide Shelley as it did. Profes-
sor Allen responded first:
I can't give a confident answer to that .... There is a transcript of the
argument of the Shelley case in which the sociological data were being ar-
gued by one of the counsel for the petitioners and there is a dialogue (I
think between Frankfurter and petitioners' counsel, perhaps Thurgood
Marshall) in which, Frankfurter in effect says, "Well, that's very interesting
but it really isn't relevant, is it Mr. Marshall?" My hunch is that the inclu-
sion of the sociological data in the brief, particularly the NAACP briefs in
the Michigan case and the amicus brief of the government, was not a waste
of time; but if you ask me to quantify the impact or the influence, I cannot
give a very satisfactory response.
Judge Frankel compared the results of a similar strategy for sociological
influence in Brown v. Board of Education3:
In school segregation, in the matter of Brown v. Board of Education, there is
a famous footnote in which sociology is made an explicit consideration.
4
I've always thought it was a misfortune and that the decision would have
been a lot better off without it. The point was illustrated by District Judge
Scarlett of South Carolina, who took evidence on school segregation from a
number of people who were running a sort of traveling circus to give such
evidence. From that evidence, the judge figured out as a matter of fact that
segregation was good for black people and therefore, he said, "since I sit as
a fact-finding court and the Supreme Court is not a fact-finding tribunal, I
don't have to follow their facts and I hold that school segregation is consti-
tutional." He was reversed the next day, as he deserved to be, and yet on
that factual ground, in his preverse way, I always thought he had a point
and that the Supreme Court made a mistake. The constitutional principle
of equal protection for blacks is one to which sociology has no relevance
one way or another. It didn't matter what surveys showed-and I think
eventually in the long history of this thing that's probably what the case
stands for.
Margaret Bush Wilson then related her personal experience with the
Shelley family and their litigation:
I was present in a session where George Vaughn and my father sat around
our dining room table and talked about what to do about Shelley. George
3. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
4. Brown, 347 U.S. at n. 11.
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Vaughn was my father's lawyer on other matters and the Shelley case now
had reached a point where the Missouri Supreme Court had ruled that the
lower court, where the Shelleys won, was now reversed. So the strategy was
simply one of "what can we do to stop this, where do we go from here."
And it was clear from the conversation that both George Vaughn and my
father knew they were going to take the case as far as it could go, and they
were going to use all the resources they could find to get it done.
I give a great salute to the NAACP for its long term strategy and the
development of the whole approach to challenging racial restrictive cove-
nants. But there is some basis for saying that the NAACP planners had
been so discouraged by the decisions that were made during that twenty-
year period, 1925-1945, that they were very reluctant to take a particular
case until all the ducks were in a row. And I have a sense that they were
not sure the Shelley case was the case they wanted to take to the U.S.
Supreme Court. So they took their time, and that led my father and the
other brokers and black families of St. Louis to say, we can't wait. They
formed their own organization, raised money and did not care to have the
NAACP involved until after the grand finale.
The people who were really the ones who were desperate in all this were
people like the Shelleys. I don't know whether people in this room know
that at that time in St. Louis, families with four and five children were
living in two rooms. There was a limited geographic area where black peo-
ple could live and the population had grown substantially. So there simply
wasn't adequate housing for these people and it was a desperate situation.
The session concluded with a question regarding whether blacks alone
were subject to restrictive covenants. Professor Ware responded that, de-
pending on where one looked in the country, covenants might have ex-
cluded Asians, native Americans, and even religious minorities such as
Jews.
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